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## Who's Afraid of Hegelian Wolves?

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One or several Hegels? That is the question that this essay will put to Deleuze, miming the well-known one that he and Guattari ask Freud at the beginning of *A Thousand Plateaus*: 'One or several wolves?' Their question begins a critical analysis of Freud's treatment of the Wolf-Man, an analysis that seeks to show that the ultimate aim of classical psychoanalysis is to reduce the infinite multiplicity of unconscious affects to the logical unity of a signifier that always ends up having the traits of the father. As the therapy develops, the phantasmatic wolves haunting the patient come to form a single one, the Oedipus Wolf. 'No sooner does Freud discover the greatest art of the unconscious,' they write, 'than we find him tirelessly at work bringing back molar unities, reverting to his familiar themes of *the father, the penis, the vagina, Castration with a capital C* . . . Who is ignorant of the fact that wolves travel in packs? Only Freud. Every child knows it. Not Freud' (ATP 27-8).

The first chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* is without any doubt one of the most gripping and convincing sections of the work, affirming that a wolf never goes about alone, and that '[t]he wolf, wolves, are intensities, speeds, temperatures, nondecomposable variable distances' (ATP 32). Yet it is precisely from the place of my firmest conviction, as it were in the heart of the crowd or pack by which I am willingly lead along, that I will venture to ask whether, in the case of Hegel, Deleuze does not in fact repeat the gesture that he condemns in Freud; whether in Deleuze's work, as in Freud's, one is not faced with this 'reductive glee' (ATP 28) by means of which multiplicity becomes a unity.

In fact the Hegel that appears in Deleuze's texts is always the *single* figure of the thinker of identity. From *Nietzsche and Philosophy* to *What is Philosophy?*, and including *Difference and Repetition*, Hegelian philosophy is presented as perfectly expressing binary logic in all its systematic heaviness: one plus one is two, and two ends up reducing to one. If, as Deleuze allows in *Difference and Repetition*, difference is 'the ground' of the dialectic, it remains that it is 'only the ground for the demonstration of the identical. Hegel's circle is not the eternal return, only the infinite circulation of the identical by means of negativity' (DR 50).

It all seems as if, in order to show that Hegel is the most powerful thinker of the principle of identity, Deleuze cuts into the quick of speculative philosophy and in so doing fixes and contains its energy. The Deleuzian discourse which sees in Hegel's dialectics a principle of repetition that does not produce difference, is itself, from one end of his work to the other, univalent and univocal. In the first place he restricts dialectics to the indefatigable process of sublation (*Aufhebung*) of difference, and, in the second place, identifies it with a highly developed form of *ressentiment*. In a single passage from *Difference and Repetition*, for example, Deleuze affirms, in the first place, that 'of all the senses of *aufheben*, none is more important than that of "raise up." There is indeed a dialectical circle, but this infinite circle has everywhere only a single centre; it retains within itself all the other circles, all the other momentary centres'; and, in the second place, that this 'raising up' is nothing more than a way of carrying that typifies Zarathustra's ass, for whom 'to affirm is to bear, to assume or to shoulder a burden. He bears everything: the burdens with which he is laden . . . those which he assumes himself . . . and the weight of his tired muscles when he no longer has anything to bear' (DR 53).

After the fashion of the wolves on Freud's couch, Hegel, as conceived of by Deleuze, apparently 'never had a chance to get away',<sup>1</sup> so much and so desperately does he come to resemble himself. 'The proper name,' we read in *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'does not designate an individual: it is on the contrary when the individual opens up to the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalization, that he or she acquires his or her true proper name. The proper name is the instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity. The proper name is the subject of a pure infinitive compounded as such in a field of intensity' (ATP 37). That analysis does not seem to apply to Hegel's proper name which is taken to be the unalterable and univocal signifier of a signified (Hegelian philos-

ophy) that is itself unalterable and univocal. Hegel benefits from no extenuating circumstances that might be brought to bear in order to vary the intensity of his name, conferring on it the rich and extensive register of semantic variegation.

Never does Deleuze seek to determine what the Hegelian equivalent of 'conceptual personae' would be. No outline of Hegelian philosophy is drawn, if by 'outline' we understand what *What is Philosophy?* calls the 'plane' of someone's thinking. This plan(e), constitutive of each particular philosophy, is a complex play of movements 'that are reversible and folded within each other' (WP 75). Concepts are 'personae' which emerge from the plane at the same time as they create it: 'There are innumerable planes, each with a variable curve, and they group together or separate themselves according to the points of view constituted by personae. Each persona has several features that may give rise to other personae, on the same or a different plane: conceptual personae proliferate' (WP 76). In their own way these 'personae' constitute the pack, or conceptual multiplicity, that assures the vitality of a given philosophy. The philosophies of Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Nietzsche provide the most striking examples. Even Descartes, for whom, in the *Dialogues* with Claire Parnet, Deleuze declares his aversion, is called upon to back up this idea of the personae.<sup>2</sup>

The Hegel 'case' is presented as a case apart. Near the beginning of *What is Philosophy?* the reader might think that Deleuze is going to deal with the philosophical pack as it relates to speculative thought, its plane and its personae: 'Hegel [had] the idea of making use of contradiction between rival opinions to extract from them suprascientific propositions able to move, contemplate, reflect, and communicate in themselves and within the absolute (the speculative proposition wherein opinions become moments of the concept)' (WP 80). There, readers might think, we find what we expected: the staging of a certain multiplicity that is inherent in the functioning of Hegelian philosophy; mobile points relating to each other within a differential play, the inter-reflection of opposing forces . . . the Hegelian wolves have, perhaps, finally been recognized. Very quickly, however, the axe falls, cutting cleanly the wings that Deleuze and Guattari for a moment saw growing from the System. Indeed the text continues as follows:

But, beneath the highest ambitions of the dialectic, and irrespective of the genius of the great dialecticians, we fall back into the most abject conditions that Nietzsche diagnosed as the art of the pleb or bad taste in philosophy: a reduction of the concept to propositions like simple

opinions; false perceptions and bad feelings (illusions of transcendence or of universals) engulfing the plane of immanence; the model of a form of knowledge that constitutes only a supposedly higher opinion, *Urdoxa*; a replacement of conceptual personae by teachers or leaders of schools.

The countless traits that gave the thinking its vitality, the elementary pulsation of philosophy, the speed, movement and conceptual silhouettes are found, in the case of Hegel, to be once again frozen on a fixed plane, in the immobile image and severe and fatigued visage of the Prussian professor whose friends very early on nicknamed 'the old man.'

Hegel never has a chance to get away. Let us imagine for a moment that a student confides in Deleuze, saying that in reading Hegel she sees, if not wolves, at least a pack of something. Let us suppose that this student adds that she considers the Hegelian system not to be like a tree, like a unicentred thinking, but a process of distribution of singularities, the regulated explosion of an energy free of all fixity, an economy of the *fluidity* of the real and of thinking; that she is particularly interested in Hegel's preoccupation with 'fluidifying solidified thinking,' with dispossessing consciousness of its mastery. Would not Deleuze reply that it is impossible to uncover something like a pack or band within the dialectic? 'What is it I see, then?' the student would ask. 'You see a camel, an ox, an ass. Several animals, perhaps, but a single figure: that, precisely, of the unity that lays claim to its burden, its saddlebags, its harness, and moos, bleats, and brays.'<sup>3</sup>

Just as, according to Deleuze and Guattari, for Freud to constitute psychoanalysis the wolves have to be domesticated, so the nomadic thought of difference and the rhizome is perhaps developed at the expense of a certain Hegelian multiplicity. One wonders as much when confronted with a Hegel so uniform, so monochrome, a Hegel who plays the role of the detested domestic animal. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 'Freud only knows the Oedipalized wolf or dog, the castrated-castrating daddy-wolf, the dog in the kennel' (ATP 28-9). But doesn't Deleuze in fact transform Hegel into a dog? Doesn't Hegel become the 'bow-wow' of contemporary philosophers, the abhorred victim of the pack of the thinkers of difference, their absolute enemy?

Speaking of the enemy one thinks of the following passage from *Nietzsche and Philosophy* where Deleuze writes concerning Nietzsche: 'We will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see "against whom" its principle concepts are directed. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it fights' (NPH 162). In this case Nietzsche would himself certainly argue for multi-

plicity as against unity. Enemies are, in fact, always several, and Zarathustra is indeed 'grateful' to a plurality of enemies.<sup>4</sup> One cannot therefore be sure that Nietzsche makes Hegel his single, worst enemy. I am led again to pose the question: One or several Hegels?

In spite of appearances my foreword is not polemical. It is not a matter of prosecuting the case of 'Deleuze as reader of Hegel' nor even of proposing a critique of such a reading. It is rather a matter of exposing a difficulty. If, in order to thematize Deleuze's relation to Hegel, one limits oneself to picking up on the numerous passages where the former deals with the latter, then one will not get very far. One would have to be content with enumerating a list of complaints, or with staging a duel between Hegel and Nietzsche, repeating blow by blow the well-known pages of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Anyone who has read Deleuze knows those pages well. What purpose would be served by reproducing or paraphrasing them?

Would the solution therefore be to 'save' Hegel by showing that Deleuze's thinking is already 'understood by' or 'included in' the dialectic, to play Hegel off against Deleuze? Deleuze has already thought of this and forestalls such a possibility. In *Difference and Repetition* he shows that by opposing difference to Hegelian unity, he perhaps runs the risk of appearing like a new figure of the 'beautiful soul.' 'The beautiful soul,' he writes, 'is in effect the one who sees differences everywhere and appeals to them only as respectable, reconcilable or federative differences, while history continues to be made through bloody contradictions. The beautiful soul behaves like a justice of the peace thrown on to a field of battle, one who sees in the inexpiable struggles only simple "differends" or perhaps misunderstandings' (DR 52). Deleuze here explicitly thematizes the objection that 'Hegelians' might make: that he understands the thinking of difference as a later movement of the dialectic, the romantic preference for the multiplicity of all things, irreducible to the concept, and condemned in advance by the concept itself which always ends up claiming its rights.

Deleuze cuts the objection short:

It is not enough to harden oneself and invoke the well-known complementarities between affirmation and negation, life and death, creation and destruction (as if these were sufficient to ground a dialectic of negativity) in order to throw the taste for pure differences back at the beautiful soul, and to weld the fate of real differences to that of the negative and contradiction. For such complementarities as yet tell us nothing about the relation between one term and the other. (DR 52)

These declarations prevent one from giving in to the temptation to 'dialecticize' the opposition difference-contradiction or affirmation-negation by demonstrating the solidarity among those instances that are so differentiated.<sup>5</sup> The logic of dialectical inversion is, for Deleuze, efficacious only up to a point: it never takes account of its presuppositions or of its origin. In putting such an inversion to work, however cleverly, one can never know whether the energy it produces derives from an ontological primacy attributed to negativity, or whether it is a by-product of affirmation, since, as such, the latter is always already differentiated and differential. Does the dialectical complementarity of the terms of an opposition proceed from an originary 'No' or from a limitless 'Yes'? That is the very question to which Hegelian philosophy does not provide the answer, which in turn limits dialectical logic to a simple procedure.

In the case of the adversarial dialogue between Deleuze and Hegel only an *evaluation*, in the Nietzschean sense of the term, would allow us to assess the forces present and come not to a solution, or resolution, of the conflict, but to an uncovering of the network or dynamic constellation that *motivates* it. But the painstaking discovery of such a hierarchy – that which shows precisely the originarity of differential affirmation with respect to negativity, inasmuch as every evaluation supposes, as its condition of possibility, the play of differentiated forces – is in no way a Hegelian gesture. The dialectic indeed ignores the Nietzschean sense of genealogy. Given that, denouncing Deleuze's contradiction, claiming to reduce his antagonism towards Hegel to a manifestation of the dialectic by exposing his beautiful soul and by exploiting the evident structural binarity of certain polemical statements, would lead us nowhere.

But there still remains this Hegel who appears so adequate to himself in Deleuze's texts. If the hypothetical approach that I just referred to cannot account for it or talk about it, what remains to be done? If Deleuze manages to reduce Hegelian philosophy to a unity, the solution would no doubt lie in *problematizing this unity itself*, in exposing its differentiated structure in other terms. In bringing to light the fact that the unity of Deleuze's Hegel *both is and isn't what it is*, one arrives at a crossing of pathways where one might encounter the real sense of the confrontation between these two philosophers. A unity that is what it is not and isn't what it is can in fact be analysed just as easily as an instance of the dialectic (a unity that denies itself), or as a differential force (the two possibilities being interpreted as simply juxtaposed). I shall let this 'as easily as' be; that is to say I shall not choose. The crossing of pathways just referred to is a *non-critical*

crossing, one which does not preside over a decision, but results from (just as it causes it) a *complication*. In complicating the relation between Deleuze and Hegel one manages to show how the two thinkers form one against the other, or one with the other, something like a 'block of becoming,' one of those heterogeneous and unnatural combinations that Deleuze is wont to speak of.

What then is the source of the complication? If, for Deleuze, there seems to be only *one* Hegel, this unity is brought about by *two possible scenarios: reduction and exception*. By unifying Hegel's philosophy in the extreme, Deleuze first of all reduces it, just as Freud reduces his wolves. At the same time this extreme reaction amounts to an exceptional treatment for no other philosopher meets this fate in Deleuze's work. Therefore, Hegel is, to a certain extent, given privileged treatment; he becomes the *only one*, with all the negative respect one pays to an absolute *heteron*: unable to be assimilated and thus veritably other. When the band, or the pack, turns its back on Hegel, his position comes paradoxically into relief and this becomes a *phenomenon* of Deleuze's philosophy. The French expression 'It's a phenomenon!' refers to the appearance of something exceptional, a surprising, unexpected, or even monstrous event.

My question is as follows: does not Hegel, inasmuch as he incarnates in the extreme a 'nomal' unity, become Deleuze's '*anomalous*,' the unavoidable and indispensable 'phenomenon of bordering' the packs that run in all directions through his text? In the chapter from *A Thousand Plateaus* entitled 'Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible,' Deleuze and Guattari write: 'wherever there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual . . . There may be no such thing as a lone wolf, but there is a leader of the pack, a master of the pack, or else the old deposed head of the pack now living alone, there is the Loner, and there is the Demon' (ATP 243). By dint of being designated in such a haunting, insistent, obsessive way, as adequate to itself, rule, or law (*nomos*), does not Hegel's name end up by setting itself apart from those of all other philosophers, by exceeding them as leader of the pack or their '*anomalous*'? The *anomalous* is 'a Greek noun that has lost its adjective [and that] designates the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization' (ATP 244). What if Hegel were to assure Deleuze's text of a certain coarseness, what if he were to take to the extreme the territories and the trees?

If that were the case then the figure of Hegel would *synthesize* two forms of unity: unity by reduction and unity by exception; a unity that I shall call a unity by *subtraction of the pack* (process whereby the

wolves reduce to a single wolf), and a unity by *secretion of the pack* (appearance of the exceptional individual on the edge of excessiveness [*comme bord de débordement*]). Deleuze reduces Hegelian multiplicity by subtraction and makes Hegel appear as his outsider. The problem is then to know why Deleuze never recognizes Hegel as his white whale, leaving to the reader the task of recognizing in his relentless opposition to the dialectic the impassioned limping of a Captain Ahab. This non-recognition might also take on the value of a *symptom* that readers, as ad hoc psychoanalysts, would take it upon themselves to interpret. What Hegel would thus be the symptom of, in incarnating both unities at once, is perhaps the impossibility of maintaining their difference right to the end, of keeping the 'lone wolf' apart from the 'leader of the pack'. Perhaps the wolf and the *anomalous* would in this way revert to the same thing. I shall let Hegel be the judge of that, proposing a confrontation between a Deleuze visited by Hegel, and a Hegel revisited by Deleuze.

Such an enterprise involves bringing Hegel into the field of the pack, which offers the advantage of deterritorializing the expected place of debate, and interrogating, on an uncharted terrain, the old concepts of unity, system, becoming and teleology.

Unity by subtraction and unity by exception do not seem, at first glance, to have anything to do with one another. Their two economies are reflected in *A Thousand Plateaus* as two contrasting, even contrary movements. The first, you will remember, is elaborated in the chapter entitled 'One or Several Wolves?' the second in 'Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible.' The development of the second relies on various examples, the most striking being the film *Willard* by Daniel Mann, whose subtitle might be the 'Rat-Man,' and *Moby Dick*.

What brings about the essential difference of these two economies is the conception of *becoming* that underwrites them. In the first case (Freud's assimilation of the pack of hallucinatory wolves to the single figure of the father), becoming is assigned to a teleology, with unity as its result. In the second ('Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale', ATP 243), becoming is 'adestinal', in that the exceptional individual does not result from it but forms its border.

Teleological becoming is conceived of as a 'tension towards'; it is necessarily oriented or destined. Even if Deleuze and Guattari do not make this explicit, it is clear that for them Freud inherits this conception of becoming from a whole philosophical tradition represented above all by Hegel, a tradition that thinks the fundamental articulation of becoming and of the *telos*. Becoming, Hegel explains in the *Science*

of *Logic*, is at the same time the end (*Ende*) of becoming: the aim of becoming is its own cessation. Hegel affirms that 'there is nothing which is not an intermediate state between being and nothing',<sup>6</sup> but this intermediary state, this middle [*milieu*] cannot be sustained. It tends towards rest or stasis, that is to say towards the formation of a 'being-there,' a determinate individual that achieves, through the very position of its ontological configuration, the indefinite movement of the inversion of pure being and pure nothingness one within the other: 'Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result' ('*eine haltunglose Unruhe, die in ein ruhiges Resultat zusammensinkt*') (SL 106). Conceived of in this manner, becoming follows the *principle of individuation*: being and nothingness are finally synthesized in a particular form.

This dialectic of becoming, which is exposed in all its conceptual purity in the *Science of Logic*, pertains to the fundamental process that inspires the whole Hegelian system: the process of the genus (*Gattung*) which commands the principle of individuation. The genus, universal abstract of the species or essence, has its particular form in given individuals which, in dying, dissolve and so return to generic universality. It is in the movement from genus to genus that the telos of becoming is accomplished: pure being-pure nothingness, being-there (individual), effective universality (dialectical synthesis of individual and genus).

Let us examine in this light the becoming of the animal such as it is elaborated in the *Philosophy of Nature*, the second volume of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. The vital movement of the individual animal, the tension that assures its vitality, comes not from a plenitude but from a lack. In fact, the animal is sensitive to the incommensurable separation between its individuality and the genus it belongs to, a separation which is paradoxically experienced on the basis of the very unity of the individual and the genus: 'This relationship is a *process* which begins with a *need*; for the individual as a *singular* does not accord with the genus immanent in it, and yet at the same time is the identical self-relation of the genus in *one* unity; it thus has the *feeling* of this defect (*er hat so das Gefühl dieses Mangels*).'<sup>7</sup> The becoming of the animal is motivated by a double tension: the drive (*Trieb*) of the genus within it, acting like an instinct for self-preservation (feeling of unity with the genus), and the lack of the genus within it (feeling of a defect on the part of the individual, limited to its being-there, with respect to the unlimited power of the genus; the individual's incapacity to constitute a genus all by itself).

The becoming of such a becoming is accomplished in sexual reproduction, in copulation with another animal that leads to the birth of a

new individual or being-there: 'The genus is therefore present in the individual as a straining against the inadequacy of its single actuality, as the urge to obtain its self-feeling in the other of its genus, to integrate itself through union with it and through this mediation to close the genus with itself and bring it into existence – *copulation*' (PN 411). At the same time this attempt to dispense with the tension that separates it from its genus only serves to accentuate that separation and precipitate the individual towards death, that is to say towards a return to the anonymity of the genus: 'The genus preserves itself only through the destruction of the individuals who, in the process of generation, fulfil their destiny and . . . in this process meet their death' (PN 414).

These reminders are intended to shed light on the attachment of Freudian psychoanalysis, as interpreted by Deleuze, to the philosophical tradition, notably to the thinking of Hegel. One can see that for the latter the other of the animal is still *an* animal. At first sight there is no pack, just a couple. That is to say the other of the animal united with *an* animal is still *an* animal: the offspring. One can see that when becoming is subordinated to the logic of the genus in this way, it remains inseparable from the destiny of the *family*. Yet it is precisely the family that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, remains the norm for Freudian psychoanalysis.

The axiomatic of the family is the guiding force in the analysis of the Wolf-Man and it presides over the process of reduction to a unity by subtraction of the pack. Little by little Freud redirects the errant wolves along the sure path of generic union, thus guaranteeing the role of the parents and the sound functioning of the reproductive process. A passage from *A Thousand Plateaus* is worth citing in full, for it describes most precisely this process of subtraction:

With false scruples he [Freud] asks, How are we to explain the fact that there are five, six, or seven wolves in this dream? . . . The wolves will have to be purged of their multiplicity. This operation is accomplished by associating the dream with the tale, 'The Wolf and the Seven Kid-Goats' (only six of which are eaten). We witness Freud's reductive glee; we literally see multiplicity leave the wolves to take the shape of goats that have absolutely nothing to do with the story. Seven wolves that are only kid-goats. Six wolves: the seventh goat (the Wolf-Man himself) is hiding in the clock. Five wolves: he may have seen his parents make love at five o'clock, and the Roman numeral V is associated with the erotic spreading of a woman's legs. Three wolves: the parents may have made love three times. Two wolves: the first coupling the child may have seen was the two parents *more ferarum*, or perhaps even

two dogs. One wolf: the wolf is the father, as we all knew from the start. Zero wolves: he lost his tail, he is not just a castrator but also castrated. (ATP 28)

Does this passage from one to zero not correspond to the process whereby Hegel's individual, in coupling, tends towards death, that is to say towards generic undifferentiation? If, in Freud, the feeling of insufficiency is not a fact of consciousness but the very manifestation of the unconscious, it still remains a sentiment, or a fear of an insufficiency to the extent that castration can continue to be read as a lack, the phantasmatic inscription within the individual of a generic defect. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari are able to hold that the Freudian unconscious indeed retains far too much consciousness of its genus: 'Castration,' they write, 'lack, substitution: a tale told by an overconscious idiot who has no understanding of multiplicities as formations of the unconscious' (ATP 32).

The process of reduction to a unity by subtraction of the pack is organized, as we have seen, according to the logic, revealed by Hegel, of the becoming of the animal. According to Deleuze and Guattari, this concerns more consciousness than the animal itself, and imprints on becoming a categorial movement that doesn't belong to it. For the becoming of the animal as traditionally interpreted they substitute the concept of the 'becoming-animal'. Such a concept must be examined if we are to analyse the process of unity by exception, by secretion of the pack, a process that allows one to 'escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come, and instead distinguish between different types of multiplicity' (ATP 32).

The Wolf-Man cries out his anguish, that of the becoming-wolf, and Freud is powerless to comprehend the phenomenon and so attempts to reinstall him within the becoming of the wolf: individual-parents-species/genus. In the becoming-wolf of the Wolf-Man Freud hears only 'I am transforming myself into a wolf,' 'I am in the process of becoming a wolf.' But Deleuze and Guattari show that the becoming-animal does not amount to becoming an animal; real becoming does not correspond to that traditional definition, namely a mediation on the way to an end or predetermined production. Becoming does not come to an end in the being that has become: 'the human being does not "really" become an animal any more than the animal "really" becomes something else . . . What is real is the becoming itself, the

block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes' (ATP 238).

Such an understanding of becoming removes the concept from the Hegelian definition of an intermediate state between being and nothingness. Becoming is not a hesitation between the abyssal vertigo of absence of form and the security of a particular incarnation. It has 'neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination' (ATP 293). Becoming is a pure milieu which means that this milieu is not 'in the middle of,' is not a force that is in the process of coming into being, a movement of *presentification* but a momentary assemblage that cannot and will not give its reason for being.

At the end of John Huston's film of *Moby Dick* Ahab is seen tied to the whale, stretched out on its white back in a sort of ecstatic crucifixion. This image – let us agree to ignore for the moment Deleuze's insistence that a becoming cannot be represented – might allow us to understand what a 'block of becoming' is, what the becoming-whale of Ahab is, something that is not to be confused with Ahab's 'becoming a whale'. The becoming-whale of Ahab begins where generic insufficiency ends. In fact Ahab finds in the whale a death which is not that of his genus, which does not lead him back, in other words, to the generic universality that he is supposed to have sprung from. The ropes attaching him to the back of *Moby Dick* symbolize relations which radically differ, by their very nature, from those of the syllogism of the species. In dying, Ahab does not try to 'put aside a feeling of insufficiency', to the extent that he does not lack the whale. He constitutes with it a block of being which subverts both filiation and reproduction. Neither the totem, the fetish, nor any discourse of metamorphosis can exhaust the complexity of such a symbiosis.

Melville's fiction emphasizes something that is nothing other than a natural phenomenon. There are laws of nature that exceed the laws of nature to the extent that they cannot be described or classified. These are the laws of transport which 'cross neither the barrier of essential forms nor that of substances or subjects' (ATP 253), but exist in the middle of those forms and remain devoid of any destiny. Thus, for example, when a wasp lands on an orchid, 'there is a block of becoming that snaps up the wasp and the orchid, but from which no wasp-orchid can ever descend' (ATP 238). The wasp and the orchid are transported one towards the other without their being-together taking on any form. Their meeting is a fortuitous contagion, not a filial attraction. 'Unnatural participations or nuptials,' write Deleuze and Guattari, 'are the true Nature spanning the kingdoms of nature . . . These combinations are neither genetic nor structural; they are inter-

kingdoms . . . That is the only way Nature operates – against itself (ATP 241–2). There are alliances that no state – community of scientists, or political entity – would recognize, communities that no institution could assimilate, no more than could a taxonomy or history.

It is important to distinguish two points of view concerning the living: that of physiology and that of ethics, according to Spinoza's definition of that term. Physiology takes as its object specific and general characteristics, organs and functions. Ethics on the other hand deals with the *power* of a body, with what a body *can do*, which no organic physics can account for. The power of a body is measured in *affects*. According to Spinoza 'a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds' (ATP 260). Ethics, or 'ethology,' considers therefore the affects of a body,<sup>8</sup> the ways in which they can combine with the affects of another body 'either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body' (ATP 257). The degree of intensity of affects, the particularity of their relations [*agencements*] can engender differences among individuals of the same genus which are greater than that between one genus and another: 'A racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox' (ATP 257). Ethology allows one to take account of what cannot be calculated in living beings. Whether a horse becomes a racehorse or a workhorse is not included in its genus; in this sense the becoming-animal is *what is unexpected in a genus*. Blocks of becoming formed by the adestinal composition of the affects of two bodies represent an improvisation, a sort of ontological jazz. The logic of relations between the individual and generic essence are completely incapable of explaining it.

Deleuze and Guattari measure this power or capacity for improvisation in molecules, or in particles. Their 'jackal-particles' (ATP 37) have nothing to do with the jackal-being – form, colour, means of reproduction, cry, etc. – but with what the jackal can do. One will say that what the jackal can do, precisely, is be of such a colour, laugh, reproduce. That is true but the quality of its colour, the condition of its fur, etc., depend on unexpected encounters – always individual, unable to be generalized – that the animal has with its milieu and with other animals. An assemblage with other bodies takes place along a line of flight through which a body escapes from itself, from its form,

and momentarily from its destination. Thus wasp particles, within the wasp-orchid block, are molecules of energy unleashed from the wasp-being, a sort of exudation of a subject that becomes suspended from itself in order to form a relation with another by means of an arrangement that renders both to some extent unrecognizable. This excess of the subject by means of which it becomes desubjectivized, entering into relations without reproducing and creating something new without procreating, is indeed a possibility which becomes part of the animal's power to act and which has the same validity as its specific characteristics. Assemblages of affects are conceived of in terms of film montage: the animal puts together the sequences of its life, developing veritable 'cuts' of becoming or energy 'shortcuts.' Ethology is thus the science of animal cinema.

The concept of the 'pack' in *A Thousand Plateaus* needs to be understood on the basis of potentialities belonging to affects. The pack is in the first place an intense mass, a molecular swelling. Affects, like animals, act in 'schools, bands, herds, populations' (ATP 241), multiplicities that are irreducible to unities, to the comforting figure of a familiar or familial animal, to something representing drives, or parents. A pack 'doesn't represent anything,' it is affect 'in itself, the drive in person' (ATP 259); its energy is libidinal energy itself, forming 'at any given moment a single machinic assemblage, the faceless figure of the libido' (ATP 36). By ignoring that 'wolves travel in pairs' and especially in packs, and by being overconsc(ient)ious, Freud, according to Deleuze and Guattari, lacks that very energy.

We have reached the point where it is possible to grasp the important difference between the becoming of the animal and the becoming-animal. The question now is to know what determines the *type* of pack, the particularities of one with respect to another, given that the classifying principles of genus and species have been discounted. At this point the exceptional individuality or anomaly comes into play, leading us back to the difference between unity by subtraction of the pack and unity by secretion of the pack.

'Every animal has its anomalous. Let us clarify that: every animal swept up in its pack or multiplicity has its anomalous' (ATP 243). The anomalous or exceptional individual runs alongside the pack, thus determining its type: 'no band is without this phenomenon of bordering, or the anomalous' (ATP 246). Unity appears here through the figure of the 'leader of the pack', one who is privileged and cursed at the same time. So, for example, Willard in the film of the same name, 'has his favorite, the rat Ben, and only becomes-rat through his relation with him, in a kind of alliance of love, then of hate' (ATP 243).

What is a border? It is a line that establishes inclusion [*appartenance*]. Deleuze and Guattari take as an example the swarm of mosquitoes analysed by René Thom in his *Structural Stability and Morphogenesis*. In this swarm or pack 'each individual moves randomly unless it sees the rest [of the swarm] in the same half-space; then it hurries to re-enter the group. Thus stability is assured in catastrophe by a barrier.'<sup>9</sup> The anomalous fixes the line beyond which the pack ceases to exist or beyond which its type changes. The border is 'the enveloping line or farthest dimension, as a function of which it is possible to count the others, all those lines or dimensions that constitute the pack at a given moment (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity changes nature)' (ATP 245).

The word 'nature' should not be misunderstood. In fact the border couldn't be less natural, to the extent that the anomalous is not 'the bearer of a species presenting specific or generic characteristics in their purest state; nor is it a model or unique specimen; nor is it the perfection of a type incarnate; nor is it the eminent term of a series; nor is it the basis of an absolutely harmonious correspondence' (ATP 244). The phenomenon of a pack's border is not its most representative element or its most highly developed specimen. The individuals forming a pack have no generic or specific community and cannot, from this point of view, become the object of a taxonomy. Moreover a multiplicity is not defined by the elements or characters composing it, but rather by the arrangements of affects that it forms. Given that, the anomalous carries only affects; it is not, as such, a subjectivity, an offspring, a child; perhaps it does not even have a sex. It occurs in the pack like an excess, a secretion, overflowing its confines yet enveloping it.

The anomalous borders the pack in several ways. Its position cannot even be fixed once and for all. 'The exceptional individual,' write Deleuze and Guattari, 'has many possible positions' (ATP 243). It sometimes borders as the 'head of the band' (in a hierarchical position), sometimes as the 'Loner on the sidelines of the pack' (it then becomes the 'edge' of the pack and does not really seem to be affected by it, like Moby Dick in relation to the other whales). Its role is to mark out the end of a series and the imperceptible move to another possible series, like the eye of a needle of affects, the point of passage by means of which one motif is stitched to another, as in Michaux' drawings where the order of the streaks changes serially, determining the hallucinatory becoming of simple pencil strokes. There is no logical order to these linkages, these passages, these transformations from one border to another, from one multiplicity to another.

The becoming-animal bordered by its anomaly is thus absolutely different from the becoming of the animal, oriented as the latter is towards reproduction, tending towards the stasis of the being that has become, obeying the rule of the multiple in the reassuring figure of the one. As one can see the anomalous is not one, child or father; it does not teleologically accomplish the movement of an individual life. Its figure and function are unpredictable, its position unlocalizable; it is restricted to stabilizing the pack in a merely temporary and local manner, directing without any logic transformations or linkages of multiplicities: the exceptional individual is but a line of flight.

Let us now come back to the Hegel whose thinking is not supposed to take account of becoming in any real sense, any more than it does the phenomenon of the exceptional individual. Let us return to him who, it seems, has never encountered the pack. At this point in the discussion can he have anything to say?

Precisely this, as I suggested earlier: that unity by subtraction and unity by exception compose one with the other in a fundamental manner; that in trying to think one without the other, in trying to insist on the second as *the* truth concerning the pack, one overlooks the pack at the very point where one claims to be following it. As a result the pack reassembles, in spite of itself, in the most traditional figure of unity there is: *it becomes God*.

We have seen that becoming-animal has no foreseeable end. Its operation is ateleological and for this reason it subverts knowledge and calculation. The pack can self-destruct; it can also constitute 'a new borderline, an active line that will bring other becomings' (ATP 251). Deleuze and Guattari make it clear that 'no one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another' (ATP 250). The becoming of the pack is unpredictable; it belongs to the order of the *secret*. If, at the beginning of this essay I characterized unity by exception as unity by *secretion*, it was already in order to allude to the 'secret as secretion' (ATP 287).

In view of all that, does not conceiving of becoming as something unassignable, as resisting all anticipation including the divine, amount to positing this becoming as more divine than God himself? In not wanting to *inscribe* an end upon becoming, does one not make it potentially infinite, a potential 'perhaps' that keeps its actualization in reserve like the suspension of grace? A pack that *can end can also not end*. Negativity always returns to haunt the process that thought it was



exempt from it or could ignore it, and that process inevitably gets transformed, for Hegel, into a bad infinite, a spurious infinity. According to Deleuze the pack is not aware of the negative. Let me take as my example the following sentence: 'Physicists say that holes are not the absence of particles but particles traveling faster than the speed of light. Flying anuses, speeding vaginas, there is no castration' (ATP 32); or again: 'Even the failures are part of the plane' (ATP 255). Deleuze doesn't want to let anything get by and from this point of view a hole is no more negative than a wolf. We thus find again his refusal to recognize lack as the driving force behind becoming. Hegel would reply that a pack that lacks nothing ceases to exist as a pack, to the extent that it is impossible to conceive of a pack without greed, hunger, an end of some sort. The pack is necessarily involved in a chase, it includes its sick, its mangy, its *Lumpenproletariat*, whose elementary figure is in reality nothing other than the family, the tatters from which all life proceeds.

It is teleology which, paradoxically, inscribes fatigue within difference, the dialectic that gives to the pack the necessary wearing down [*usure*] of its being. Depriving becoming of any immanent end amounts to limiting it from outside as Hegel argues in the Doctrine of Being,<sup>10</sup> and one can consider that the anomalous, whose presence does not correspond to any logical or teleological necessity, brutally assures the pack of its end and imposes a check [*arrêt*] and a limit on its 'perhaps' or the potentiality of its being [*le peut-être*] with the same violence Freud resorts to in reducing the wolves to a unity. Exception becomes as repressive as subtraction.

What remains therefore, in the light of what I have just said, is to attempt to sketch out Hegel's thinking concerning the pack. Evidently there is nothing in his work on the pack as multiplicity or group of animals; still it is possible to uncover a conception of the pack on the level of a single animal – as if the latter were of itself a horde. In what respect can we say this is so? Inasmuch as the organism can be analysed as a flux of intensity or intensities of energy.

A sustained and attentive reading of Hegelian thought concerning the animal shows, unlike what I elaborated in the first part of this essay, not an opposition but an astonishing proximity to that of Deleuze. I hope to demonstrate that in both authors there is a problematic of *animal habit* that appears as an *economy of multiplicity*. Clearly, in Hegel, habit is completely tied to a teleology and the logic of the genus; but it would now be possible to show that teleology, far from suspending the economy of multiplicity, instead brings it about. It will be important to see how teleology as conceived of by Hegel obeys a

process of production of unity that is neither subtraction nor exception, but a wearing down of the pack.

Let us investigate the question of animal habit. It may be noted in this regard that I am reading Hegel from the point of view of *Difference and Repetition*, but what I read there, starting from Deleuze's presuppositions, leads me in turn to respond to Deleuze concerning Hegel. I shall begin by recalling Deleuze's analysis of the fundamental role played by habit within the living being. He refers in that context to the Aristotelian conception of the living as composed of small animals:

A soul must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whose entire function is to contract a habit. This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed. It is simultaneously through contraction that we are habits, but through contemplation that we contract. (DR 74)

The precise question is this: how is it possible to read *contraction* and *contemplation* as well as their relation, and moreover, how should one interpret the precession of contemplation over contraction such as the syntax – 'but through' – suggests? It would be necessary to substitute *proceed* for *precede*, as we are invited to do in terms of the following statement: 'We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating – that is to say, in contracting that from which we come' (DR 74). We can consider that in Deleuze's analysis there is a starting 'situation', described in these terms: 'We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air – not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed' (DR 73). A beginning *in* the inorganic, *starting from* the inorganic and from the four elements, by a process of contraction. As the living being gets more complex it increases the number, mass and quality of its *contractions* in the triple sense of *passive and active structuration*, of a *permanent aptitude for acquisition*, and a *multiplying reduction*.

This triple process makes possible the ethological assemblage of affects that I analysed earlier. In fact it is habit that allows the individual to become singularized, a genus all to itself. Habit draws the dividing line between the racehorse and the workhorse. The *exercise* that is inherent in the functioning of habit *binds* vital energy: 'An animal forms an eye for itself by causing scattered and diffuse luminous excitations to be reproduced on a privileged surface of its body. The eye binds light, it is itself a bound light' (DR 96). The activity that

involves binding difference(s)<sup>11</sup> (here, the activity of perception of light) is double. On the one hand it means contemplation: it is only by seeing, and thus by subjecting oneself to the action of the sensible, that vision is achieved. On the other hand it means action: it is in fact by the same process of subjection, paradoxically, that the eye is formed and exercises itself: 'The eye . . . contemplat[es] the excitation that it binds. It produces itself or "draws itself" from what it contemplates (and from what it contracts and invests by contemplation)' (DR 97).

The arrangement or composition of affects presupposes habit as the law of reversibility of energies, the reciprocal mutability of passivity and activity. The continuity or repetition of a change modifies – with respect to that very change – the disposition of the being. What takes place in terms of habit is a reduction in receptivity and an increase in spontaneity. The progressive development of an internal activity explains the progressive decrease in passivity. Actions that are repeated over and over reach a higher and higher level of sufficiency and the being familiarizes itself with their circumstances. As a result habit appears at the same time as what disciplines the pack and what frees it from affect.

One is struck by the fact that, in the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel develops a problematic of habit that is very close to that of Deleuze. In his work a conception of the organism as energized horde exists in conjunction with the logic of the process of the genus.

The organism is made of the *same materials*, the *very materials* of the inorganic, which are at one and the same time *contracted*. The organic living thing, as I shall establish by following Hegel's analyses, is itself a reduction and a condensation of the elements of its milieu: water, air, nitrogen and carbon molecules. In the first place habit signifies this power of contraction. The result of such a contraction actually creates the *habitus*, that is to say the internal disposition and general constitution of the organism. Hegel calls the dialectical relation – that of identity and difference – between the inorganic components of the milieu and those of the organism, a 'theoretical' process. This leads me in turn to observe that every mechanism of adaptation of the living thing is already itself a type of *theorein*, according to the double sense of that term developed by Aristotle, namely contemplation and exercise.

In fact Hegel also shows how the living organism contracts within itself the very things it derives from: inert matter, elements, chemical processes, etc., all the constitutive moments that are dialectically linked in the *Philosophy of Nature*. In the 1805–6 text, Hegel writes: 'The general animal organism is the reconstruction of physical elements in a single ensemble [*zu Einzelnen*].'<sup>12</sup> The organism is a *habitus*

in respect of the internal disposition of its organs, a synthesis of the heterogeneous multiplicity of elements constituting the body. An animal, we must remember, is a synthesis of air, water, light, carbon, nitrogen, etc., that is to say of particles of energy that assure the fluidity of the organism.

Contraction and the formation of the *habitus* are closely linked. In the animal, this relation already appears as subjectivity. In the *Encyclopedia* version of the *Philosophy of Nature* Hegel states that 'the animal organism is the reduction of inorganic nature, sundered into separate moments, into the infinite unity of *subjectivity*' ('*die Reduktion der auseinander gefallenen unorganischen Natur in die unendliche Einheit der Subjektivität*') (PN 382). Failing an equivalent usage of the concept of contraction in German,<sup>13</sup> one finds in Hegel the more powerful concept of 'idealization,' referring back to Deleuze's analysis of habit as contemplation, that is to say as a theoretical process. I shall quote from paragraph 350 of the *Philosophy of Nature*: 'The organic individuality exists as *subjectivity* in so far as the externality proper to shape is *idealized* into members, and the organism in its process outwards preserves inwardly the unity of the self' (PN 351). Hegel's sense of idealization, referring as it does to the process of conservation and suppression, appears at the same time as a process of condensation and of synthesis, what he also calls an 'abstraction'.

As we have seen, habit presumes that change can be preserved and leave a trace. The fact that the repetition of changes produces a difference in the subject experiencing it, means that change coming from the exterior is gradually transformed into a change coming from within the organism itself, involving the body in the becoming of *its* singularity.

Impressions lose their force as they reproduce. Hegel insists on this point in paragraph 410 of the *Philosophy of Mind*. Under the effect of habit, he writes, 'the immediate feeling is negated and treated as indifferent. One gets inured against external sensations (frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, etc., sweet tastes, etc.) . . . There is indifference towards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the *habit* of their satisfaction deadened.'<sup>14</sup> Paradoxically, a decrease in sensitivity excites spontaneity. What to begin with was simply subjected to in a passive way, comes, through the action of repetition, to initiate movement and so to develop a new arrangement, a new organic becoming.

It needs to be understood that in Hegel, and this is what interests me above all, this *becoming* underwrites the becoming that is inherent in the process of the genus. In limiting his thought concerning becoming

to generic becoming, one loses sight of this most important fact, namely that for him the latter is always lacking, always a failure. In Hegel the animal experiences the fundamental failure of the becoming of the animal. It is true, as we have seen, that the 'feeling of defect' is revealed in the animal as a tendency to copulate. But we have also seen that the process of procreation (*Fortpflanzung*) comes, in the final analysis, simply to be that of the bad infinite (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*). The animal cannot fully present the genus. It cannot set up its singularity as a universal and erase the disproportion between them.

But only habit allows the animal to dispense with the bad infinite of copulation. Habit is what makes death possible by progressively killing the affective possibilities whose creation it has nevertheless contributed to. Bit by bit the body as *habitus*, as singular individual within the energized horde, ossifies, tires out utterly. In paragraph 375 of the *Philosophy of Nature* Hegel writes that 'the individual [animal] achieves only an *abstract objectivity* in which its activity has become deadened and ossified and the process of life has become the inertia of *habit*; it is in this way that the animal brings about its own destruction' (PN 441).

By means of its double and contradictory functions, vitalizing and thanatological, habit in Hegel traces a path within the telos. It sharpens vitality to the extent that it contracts affects. It dulls it inasmuch as it sharpens it. This double play of the *slice of life*<sup>15</sup> is reasoned by Hegel as the dialectical logic of *abbreviation*. In his work multiplicity is not systematically and violently reduced to a unity, it abbreviates itself, and abbreviation is the necessary wearing out that *restrains* the pack, holds it in check, suspends its infinite becoming.

Abbreviation – and not unity by subtraction – is the *sense* of the dialectic and the law of thinking. What I have just demonstrated concerning the animal is upheld by the Hegelian conception of thought as acceleration, shortcutting, wearing down [*usure*] of the qualitative intensity of its object. Understanding proceeds towards a reduction that the *Science of Logic* describes as follows: 'The understanding does indeed give them [the determinations of thought], so to speak, a *rigidity* (*Härte*) of being such as they do not possess in the qualitative sphere and in the sphere of reflection; but at the same time it *breathes life* (*begeistet*) into them and so sharpens them.'<sup>16</sup> It gives them the form of 'points.' How should one understand Hegel's 'rigidity'? In several senses. 'The rigidity of being' could first of all refer to 'the consistence (*Halt*) of being,' at the same time firmness, consequence and resistance (with respect to time, for example, greater than the resistance of the phenomenon in general). This rigidity is the dialectical emergence of a *quality* by means of a *reduction of the phe-*

*nomenal qualifier*. It follows that there is a hardness in the determination of thought, that of the heart, since the effect produced by the concept can be infinitely less 'sensitive' than the affect produced by the phenomenon. In fact, the subject is implicated to a much lesser degree when it comes into relation with the 'point' of determinateness, than it is when in contact with the practically innumerable *traits* of the phenomenon. Paradoxically the pricking that the 'point' effects can leave the tissue insensitive. But on another level the point allows one to follow the phenomenon *right to the end*, to accomplish it in a sense. Of course that also means that it is put to death in its concept. Hardness and pointing evoke at the same time the abrupt and the punctual [*point*], that is to say the *decision* by which inversion occurs, that is to say the 'point it starts from'. What becomes of the 'breath of life' [*animation*] with respect to the hardness and pointing that refer precisely to an absence of soul, if not of mind, even an absence of heart? This breath of life or inspiration is the very 'soul' of the relation that is summed up in the concept. The totality of inspirations bound to the phenomenal are found to be at the same time abstract, reassembled, related and unified by the concept. The *formalizing* reduction of speculative content, its *logical writing*, paradoxically confer on the being that is deprived of its singularities a type of singularity par excellence that is its 'characteristic' (*Eigentümlichkeit*).

Unity by abbreviation appears as the median way between unity by subtraction and unity by exception. The points of being are not subtracted from themselves. They remain potentially rich in qualitative multiplicity and intensity. None of them plays the role of the Anomal either, none borders the other. To put it another way, each is, if you wish, the anomaly of the other, its possibility and its impossibility. Its consequence and its flight [*sa suite et sa fuite*].

Wolves travel in packs. They leave their footprints in the snow, their wolf lines. But these imprints get smaller and smaller, they get abbreviated. Why do Deleuze and Guattari speak of 'small' holes without analysing this smallness, this logic of reduction that has neither father nor outsider? Hegel answers back 'little wolves' to those who call him a 'big dog'. Without these little wolves the pack would not wear out [*se fatiguer*]; becoming, even though unpredictable, gets reversed, paradoxically, as constancy, hard-wearing presence, substance. The rhyzome becomes an oaktree, *errance* becomes a lair. Didn't Hegel always know that?

I have tried to read Deleuze's relation to Hegel as symptomatic. This amounts to showing that Hegel appears in Deleuze's text as a symp-

tom, for he plays the double role of the accursed exceptional one, although that double role is never made explicit in its own right. According to my hypothesis, if that is so it is because a strict demarcation between the two unities (by subtraction and by exception) is impossible to determine, in spite of what Deleuze and Guattari say.

In attempting to bring this configuration to light I have *machinated* [*machiner*] an unusual relation between Hegel and Deleuze. I have constructed a machine, a block of becoming called Hegel-Deleuze, as unexpected yet plausible as that of the wasp and orchid, a *plateau*. Let me recall what a plateau is according to the authors of *A Thousand Plateaus*: 'We call a "plateau" any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome' (ATP 22). Constructing a plateau between difference and the dialectic allows me to render more fluid an opposition that has doubtless been made too rigid as a result of a bias in favour of a *reduction of the reduction* which risks bringing about effects contrary to those that are sought. It seems to me that such is the case with Hegel. Doing justice to Deleuze's finely wrought thinking concerning affirmation implies, in my opinion, affirming Hegel's role in it.

translated by David Wills

### ABBREVIATIONS

The following book abbreviations are used:

ATP: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

DR: Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

NPh: Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

PN: G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

SL: G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1969.

WP: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

### NOTES

- 1 Cf.: '[with Freud] the wolves never had a chance to get away and save their pack' (ATP 28).
- 2 Descartes is the object of the same aversion as Hegel: 'I could not stand Descartes, the dualisms and the cogito, or Hegel, the triad and the operation of the negation.' Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 14.
- 3 For the ass and ox, see especially DR 53. For the camel, see in particular the analysis of the 'three metamorphoses' in NPh 180-3.
- 4 Cf. especially 'The Child with the Mirror' in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, vol. XI. Ed. Oscar Levy, New York: Russell and Russell, 1964, pp. 95-8.
- 5 Consider this statement from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: 'Nietzsche's "yes" is opposed to the dialectical "no"; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment to dialectical labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical heaviness; beautiful irresponsibility to dialectical responsibilities' (NPh 9, translation modified, DW [trans.]). It is clear that in this form the statement itself invites one to 'harden' the oppositions, given its binary structure.
- 6 SL 105. See also G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 11 (*Wissenschaft der Logik*), Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978.
- 7 PN 411. See also Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 20 (*Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse [1830]*), Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992.
- 8 See, in this volume, Moira Gatens' essay.
- 9 René Thom, *Structural Stability and Morphogenesis*, trans. D. H. Fowler, Reading, MA: Benjamin Fowler/Cummings, 1975, 319. Cited in ATP 245.
- 10 SL. See Book One, section 1, chapter 2, part 3.
- 11 The German noun *Verbindung* has exactly the same sense as the liaison I am referring to here.
- 12 I am here translating the German text. Cf. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8 (*Jenaer Systementwürfe III: Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes*), Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987, p. 148: '*Der animalische allgemeine Organismus ist die Rekonstruktion der Physischen Elementen zu Einzelnen.*' I render *zu Einzelnen* as *un tout singulier*. Literally it means 'in a single (thing) only' (*en un seul*), where the adjective *seul* becomes a noun. Other passages suggest the same sense, for example: '*Hier beginnt der innere Organismus; er ist die Einheit des mechanisch Organischen und des chemisch Organischen*' ('It is here that the inner organism begins; it is the unity of the mechanical organic and the chemical organic') (155); or again: '*Der allgemeine Prozess ist diese Rückkehr des Selbst aus seiner kometarischen, lunarischen, und*

- irdischen Laufbahn zu sich Selbst* ('The general process [of the organism] involves the return of the Self towards itself out of its stellar, lunar and terrestrial course') (161).
- 13 The German verb used to render 'to contract' is *zusammenziehen* (to tighten, reduce, concentrate). Although one cannot say in German 'to contract a habit' (old usage in English) for 'to acquire a habit,' it remains that the sense of *zusammenziehen* (literally 'to con-tract,' 'to draw together') expresses perfectly the economy of the process we are analysing here. Let us also note that in German 'to make a habit of,' 'to acquire a habit' is rendered by *die Gewohnheit zu annehmen*. The expression *die Gewohnheit etwas zu tun* means 'to have a habit of doing something'; *die Gewohnheit ablegen*, on the other hand, means 'to get out of, rid oneself of a habit.'
- 14 G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, trans. William Wallace, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 141–2. See also *Gesammelte Werke*, vol 20.
- 15 In French, *taille de la vie*. *Taille* refers both to the size or measure of life, and to that which is cut or honed out of it. The verb *tailler* means 'to cut, slice, carve, trim, sharpen, tailor' (trans. note).
- 16 SL 611. Miller's translation, which has 'spiritually impregnates' for German *begeistert*, has been modified. The latter translates into French as *anime* or *spiritualise* (trans. note).

## The Encounter with Spinoza

Pierre Macherey

And even the authors about whom you have written, whether it is Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche or Proust, or whether it is Foucault – you did not treat them as authors, that is as objects of recognition, you found in them these acts of thought without image, blind as well as blinding, these violences, these encounters, these nuptials which make them creators well before they are authors. It can always be said that you were trying to pull them towards you. But they would scarcely let themselves be pulled. You would only meet those who had not been waiting for you to produce encounters in themselves, you claimed to extricate from the history of philosophy those who had not waited for you in order to emerge. You only found creators in those who had not waited for you in order to stop being authors . . .<sup>1</sup>

Almost simultaneously in 1968 there appeared Gilles Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* and the first volume, *God*, of the monumental study of Spinoza planned by Martial Guérout (interrupted after the publication of the second volume, *The Soul*, in 1974); the following year Alexandre Matheron published his *Individu et Communauté chez Spinoza*. Jointly the three books reflect the remarkable resurgence of interest in a philosopher whose work had for some time attracted only limited academic attention in France, in the period dominated by the various 'structuralist' projects and the theoretical antihumanism that bound them together – and one should not forget that this was also the period in which an ideological revolt spreading from Germany and France came to a head, leading some to believe for a while that the era of 'bourgeois society' was coming to a definitive close. There is in all this something more, of course, than mere coincidence: an element of necessity, one might almost call it a logic,